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THE CORPORATIZATION OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH:
WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED?
Risa L. Lieberwitz∗
The following article is the text of a speech given at the Association
of American Law Schools annual meeting in January 2005, which has
been edited and footnoted for publication in the Akron Law Review.
The “corporatization” of the university has become an important
concept, particularly since the 1980s, with the ever broadening and
deepening effects of privatization on a national and global scale. While
university corporatization has affected all facets of university functions,
I will focus on its impact on academic research, with particular attention
to the life sciences.1 I will begin with an overview of the three issues
that I will explore in my talk. After providing this broad overview of the
three issues, I will explore certain aspects of these three issues in greater
detail.
The first issue is the institutional nature of the university. What
makes the university a distinctive institution—particularly, as an
institution in a democratic society? This institutional characterization
includes defining the university’s traditional public interest goals and
corresponding practices in furtherance of the public interest, including
∗
Associate Professor of Labor Law, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University;
associated faculty, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1976, University of Florida; J.D. 1979, University of
Florida. I would like to thank Professor Molly T. O’Brien, Chair of the Education Law Section of
the Association of American Law Schools for inviting me to participate in the panel on higher
education at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 2005.
1. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Confronting the Privatization and Commercialization of
Academic Research: An Analysis of Social Implications at the Local, National, and Global Levels,
12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Social Implications]; Risa L.
Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the University: Distance Learning at the Cost of Academic
Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 80–85 (2002) [hereinafter Distance Learning] (discussing the
impact of corporatization on the teaching function of the university); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The
Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 78183 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)) [hereinafter Marketing of Higher Education] (regarding the impact
of corporatization on academic research in the university).
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faculty academic freedom. The second issue that I will address in my
talk concerns the changes that have been occurring—particularly since
1980—in the definition of this institutional character of the university
and the ways that these changes have affected both the goals and
practices of the university. The term used to describe these changes—
“corporatization,” is useful and informative in capturing the changes that
have had an actual impact and that continue to have potential negative
effects on multiple areas in the university. These negative consequences
include the shift from a public to a private mission of the university,
which, in turn, has been reflected in changes in the policies and practices
in university research and teaching functions. The shift in goals from
the public to the private interest has also altered professional norms of
university faculty in ways that undermine faculty academic freedom. I
will conclude my talk with a third, larger issue, addressing some recent
developments that reflect a growing recognition of the problems
resulting from the corporatization of the university. These recent
developments, I believe, also suggest some possibilities for future
responses that can start to reclaim public interest goals and practices in
the university. I always like to give the bad news first and then give
some hope—you can’t come out of a background in labor law and
collective action without ending with some hope.
Returning to the first issue, the institutional nature of the university:
What makes the university distinctive as an institution—particularly, one
in a democratic society? This institutional definition includes defining
the goals and corresponding practices in the university. My focus here
will be on the United States, which entails placing the question of the
institutional character of the university in a social context that is divided
into public and the private spheres.2 The existence of the public/private
distinction raises the question of the appropriate model for the university
to follow. First, is the university like a public or governmental
institution in its goals and organization? This would create a model for
defining institutional goals and practices consistent with the public
interest. On the other hand, is the university more like an organization
in the private sphere, but one that is still defined according to public
interest goals—that is, a private, non-profit organization?
The
traditional definition of the American university has been as an
institution with a public interest mission, either as a public university or

2. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1406-15 (1982).
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as a private, non-profit university.3 Defining the institutional model in
terms of public interest goals requires the next step of choosing the
policy and practices that the university should adopt to further those
goals. Two key aspects of shaping institutional policies and practices in
line with the public interest concern external and internal relationships.
The first aspect—the relationship between the university and external
institutions—has traditionally emphasized the university’s independence
from outside institutions—particularly, independence from financial
supporters.4
The second aspect—internal relationships—also
emphasizes independence, focusing on the central role of faculty rights
of academic freedom to provide faculty the autonomy and independence
to define and control their work.5
In defining university goals and practices, and particularly, the
significance of university and faculty independence and autonomy, it is
useful to remember the roots of these values in the history of the
university in the United States. In the early part of the twentieth century,
university faculty engaged in collective action to form the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) to claim their rights of
autonomy in teaching and research as well as in extramural speech.6
The AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles7 recognizes some basic ideas
that we still find important today,8 including the need to act collectively
3. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, available at http://www.aaup.org/
statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm#back1a (stating that “[i]nstitutions of higher education are
conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the
institution as a whole.”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2005); Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 82-84.
4. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 83-85; J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special
Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273–77 (1989); Walter P. Metzger, Profession
and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276–
81 (1988).
5. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81.
6. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 83-85. Extramural speech includes “speech outside a
faculty member’s professional duties or disciplinary expertise, whether the speech was made on or
off campus, thus actually covering intramural and extramural speech.” Id. at 83; Marketing of
Higher Education, supra note 1, at 791.
7. THE 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 40 AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS BULL. 89
(1954), reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 155, 155–76 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967) [hereinafter
1915 DECLARATION].
8. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 155-76. The 1915 Declaration led to a response
in 1925 by the American Council on Education, which called a conference of higher education
organizations for the purpose of issuing a joint statement of principles of academic freedom and
tenure. Id. at 157. The resulting 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure
was followed by the AAUP 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which was
endorsed by the Association of American Colleges, and over subsequent decades, by over 150
academic professional organizations and universities. Id. The 1940 Statement of Principles, which
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to protect faculty from retaliation for their academic work and public
speech, which results when university administrators respond to
pressures from powerful industrialists acting as trustees or financial
benefactors of universities.9 The Declaration of Principles also
recognizes that faculty academic freedom is essential to enable faculty to
do their work in a way that fulfills the university’s public mission and its
social role as a public trust,10 free from the influence of third parties,
whether these are university administrators or trustees, legislators, or
corporate financial donors.11 The Declaration of Principles broadly
defines academic freedom to include teaching, research, and extramural
speech.12 The resulting Declaration of Principles recognizes that
academic freedom provides both individual and collective rights of
faculty, encompassing individual faculty autonomy and independence,13
as well as collective rights of faculty self governance, which includes
peer review and participation in university governance.14
The second broad issue of my talk concerns the changes that have
been occurring—particularly since 1980—in the traditional definition of
the university’s institutional character. These changes have affected
both the goals and practices of the university through the process of the
“corporatization” of the university. I will highlight three areas of the
multiple ways in which these changes have taken place.
The first concerns the change of the mission of the university, from
its traditional public interest mission to a goal of serving private market
interests of corporations and the university. This shift creates an

has been widely accepted by academic organizations and institutions, has been described as
“adher[ing] to, adapt[ing], and strengthen[ing]” the principles of the 1915 Declaration. Id. The
1915 Declaration has been called “the single most important document relating to American
academic freedom.” Byrne, supra note 4, at 276. It has also been called “the first comprehensive
analysis of academic freedom in the United States, [which] remains the foundation for the nonlegal
understanding of academic freedom within the academic world.” David M. Rabban, Functional
Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 232 (1990).
9. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 165-66. See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER &
WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 419,
426–27, 439, 439 n.94 (1955); ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE
UNIVERSITIES 14–17 (1986).
10. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 158-61 (asserting that the institutional legitimacy of
a university is dependent on its identity as a “public trust,” given the role of “education [as] the
cornerstone of the structure of society,” and “advancing knowledge by the unrestricted research and
unfettered discussion of impartial investigators”).
11. Byrne, supra note 4, at 273-76; Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81.
12. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 158.
13. Id. at 160-63.
14. Id. at 169.
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institutional conflict of interest for the university between its public
interest goals and the private economic interests that it has now adopted.
The second aspect of the changes brought about by corporatization flows
from this shift in the university’s mission, which is implemented through
university policies and practices. My focus, in this talk, is primarily on
the increased interest in the commercial potential of academic research,
particularly regarding the lucrative potential of life science research
following the mid-1970s explosion of genetic engineering and
biotechnology.15 The third aspect of the changes resulting from
corporatization relates to the impact on the professional norms of faculty
academic freedom and academic culture due to conflicts of interest
created by faculty concerns for proprietary interests in research.
The revolutionary advances in academic genetics research
coincided with important legislative and judicial developments
encouraging a huge increase in university market activity through
patenting and licensing of research. Since World War II, universities
have continued to rely heavily on public funding to support academic
research activity.16 Prior to 1980, such public research funding policy
was consistent with the value of academic freedom and universities
functioning in the public interest, as there was a presumption that
publicly funded research result would be placed into the public
domain.17 A major legislative development in 1980 altered that
15. See, MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 23-27
(1986) (discussing the impact of the development of recombinant DNA); Sheldon Krimsky, The
Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 17–18
(1999) (describing the way in which “rDNA technology . . . opened up possibilities for synthesizing
new organisms and establishing revolutionary methods for mass producing biological products,”
with the simultaneous recognition of “[t]he commercial opportunities of this discovery.”)
16. See, KENNEY, supra note 15, at 35-36 (stating that federal funding levels have consistently
provided universities with at least sixty to seventy percent of research support since 1960). See also
Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 40.
Public funding for university life sciences research is estimated at seventy to eighty percent of total
funding. David Blumenthal, Biotech in Northeast Ohio Conference: Conflict of Interest in
Biomedical Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 377, 380-81 (2002); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker,
Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 457 (1997).
17. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663, 1671–91
(1996) (detailing post-World War II government “spending on research and development to support
the war effort” and the debate of “who should own title to [government-sponsored] research”); Arti
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 92–93 (1999). The government agency could choose to dedicate an invention to
the public domain by publishing the results without obtaining a patent or by providing nonexclusive
licenses to private parties seeking to use a government-owned patent. Eisenberg, supra, at 1675–76;
Rai, supra, at 97 n.113. In some agencies, a university or other government contractor could
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presumption, with the Federal Bayh-Dole Act,18 which is based on
values in tension with the university’s public interest mission. BayhDole was enacted in the early stages of the drive toward privatization of
public services and public institutions in the United States.19 Bayh-Dole
transformed the university’s public mission by emphasizing private
corporate interests through the commercialization of publicly funded
research discoveries. Specifically, the Bayh-Dole Act authorizes and
encourages federal fund recipients to patent the results of their federally
funded research.20 The patents belong to the federal fund recipient—
including universities—which can then license these patents for use,
including exclusive licenses to for-profit corporations21 such as Merck,
Monsanto, and Novartis, for commercial development.
These market research activities undermine academic freedom and
the public mission of the university. The university’s interests now
overlap with private economic interests of business corporations,
creating a conflict of interest that compromises the university’s
independence to engage in academic research without regard to the
commercial potential of research.22 This conflict of interest, in turn, can
damage both the actual quality of the research and the public confidence
in the legitimacy of university research.23 Corporations that negotiate
exclusive licenses of university patents can now charge monopoly
prices, creating an added cost to the public through the Bayh-Dole Act’s
use of public funding as an indirect subsidy to private businesses.24 The
exclusive licensing of university-owned patents to businesses, therefore,
is tantamount to the corporate purchase of the university’s federally
funded patent.
The Bayh-Dole Act has had its desired effect of privatizing publicly
funded research, evidenced by the enormous increase in the patenting
and licensing activities in the university. In 1979, prior to the BayhDole Act, U.S. universities obtained 264 patents.25 That number
petition the federal agency to shift title from the government to the contractor. Eisenberg, supra, at
1683–84, 1691–92.
18. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2001).
19. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 780.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). See also Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1664-65.
21. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1663-65.
22. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 782, 789; Social Implications, supra
note 1.
23. Social Implications, supra note 1.
24. Id.; Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1666–69; Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1,
at 782.
25. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 292 (2003).
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increased to 2,436 patents obtained by U.S. universities in 1997,26 and
3,450 patents in 2003.27 Between 1991 and 2000, new patent
applications by U.S. universities increased by 238 percent, universityindustry licensing agreements increased by 161 percent, and royalty
revenues to universities increased by more than 520 percent.28
In addition to authorizing and encouraging the use of public
funding for the private interest, the Bayh-Dole Act also increased the
contact between industry and academia, greasing the wheels for the
growth of private corporate funding for academic research. As in the
case of increased university patenting and licensing activities since 1980,
there is also a trend of rising corporate funding of university research.
Corporate funding of university research, in general, rose from 2.3
percent in the early 1970s to almost 8 percent by the year 2000,29 and
11.7 percent of life sciences research in 1994.30 Corporate funding
includes both faculty research support and faculty consulting fees.31 At
the institutional level of the university, corporate funding has included
multi-million dollar, multi-year “strategic corporate alliances.”32 The
notorious 1998 Berkeley-Novartis agreement is the most widely
known,33 but certainly not the sole example,34 of a strategic corporate
alliance. Under these agreements, a corporation gives millions of dollars
26. Id. at 291-92.
27. Goldie Blumenstyk, Colleges Seek a Record Number of Patents, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Dec. 3, 2004, at 27.
28. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, SCI.,
Aug. 22, 2003, at 1052.
29. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 12 (2003).
30. David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the
Life Sciences–An Industry Survey, NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 8, 1996, at 368, 369–71.
31. See Blumenthal, supra note 16, at 379 (estimating that about half of life sciences faculty
members act as consultants for industry). Since the mid-1980s, twenty-one to twenty-eight percent
of life sciences faculty members have consistently received research support from industry, and
about seven to eight percent of faculty members reported that they held equity in a company related
to their research. Id. at 378-79. See Social Implications, supra note 1.
32. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 788 (quotes added); Social
Implications, supra note 1.
33. See Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 39-40 (explaining that Novartis (Syngenta)
agreed to provide $25 million of corporate funding over a five-year period in exchange for exclusive
licensing rights to about one-third of the Plant and Microbial Biology department’s discoveries).
34. See, e.g., KENNEY, supra note 15, at 67–69 (describing the 1982 agreement in which
Monsanto gave Washington University $23.5 million of corporate funds over five years in exchange
for exclusive licensing rights to patents resulting from biomedical research); Andrew Lawler, Last
of the Big-Time Spenders?, SCI., Jan. 17, 2003, at 330 (describing the 1994 agreement in which
Amgen gave $30 million of corporate funding to the MIT Departments of Biology and Brain and
Cognitive Sciences over a ten-year period in exchange for resulting patents to be owned jointly by
MIT and Amgen).
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to fund entire university departments for research programs in exchange
for the right to exclusive licenses for academic research developed in
that department or program.35 In other words, the corporation gets
exclusive monopoly control over academic research results. The
strategic corporate alliance extends additional benefits, including the
right of corporate pre-publication review of academic research,36
preferred access to faculty, students, and university facilities,37 and the
right to participate in the process of deciding which faculty will be
awarded corporate research funds.38
Similarly to the Bayh-Dole Act, the growth in private corporate
funding imposes multiple costs on the public.39 Although public funding
of research is not at issue, the public mission of the university is still at
issue, with similar costs to the public interest. Through the use of
patents and licenses, the public domain of academic research results will
be restricted. The university is placed in a conflict of interests, as it
seeks to attract corporate funding for academic research that will
enhance the corporation’s and the university’s financial interests rather
than the public interest. As the university and faculty become business
partners with the funding corporation, the university loses its
independence. The distinction between the research and development
department of a for-profit corporation and the research carried out in a
university starts to become blurred or perhaps completely
unrecognizable in certain aspects.
Among faculty, the market-driven policies and practices of
university corporatization undermine traditional professional norms of
academic freedom, which are based on faculty autonomy and
independence from private economic interests—whether those private
interests are those of the faculty member, the university, or third-party
funders.40 Such independence is needed to support the quality and
integrity of the research and to support a faculty culture that values
35. Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 788; Social Implications, supra note 1.
36. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 216-26 (1987) (stating that publications may be delayed for three to six
months to provide time for corporate review and for filing patent applications); Krimsky, supra note
15, at 30; Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law,
Values, and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187,
201–12 (2002).
37. KENNEY, supra note 15, at 55–72.
38. Charles C. Caldart, Industry Investment in University Research, SCI., TECH., & HUM.
VALUES, Spring 1983, at 24-25; Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 40.
39. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 786-88; Social Implications, supra
note 1.
40. See Byrne, supra note 4, at 273-76; Metzger, supra note 4, at 1276-81.
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openness in research—sharing research methods and results in the public
domain.41 The expansion of the public domain, in turn, promotes the
quality and advancement of academic research, as researchers share their
discoveries and test the research results of their colleagues. The shift of
university mission from public to private interests and the accompanying
increase in market-driven practices have had a negative impact on these
professional norms and culture of academic freedom. Similar to the
university institutional conflict of interests, faculty involved in market
activities have individual professional conflicts of interest.42 Communal
values are undermined by increased secrecy resulting from private
economic concerns about preserving proprietary rights in research
results.43 Dependence on corporate research funds compromises
independence in research, for example, when the university
administration or faculty agree to submit research results for corporate
review prior to publication. Studies have demonstrated a significant
impact on research, with more favorable research results concerning the
corporate funder’s product by faculty whose research is funded by the
corporation.44 Disturbing incidents have been reported of corporate
pressure placed on faculty researchers to change or suppress research
findings that go against the corporation’s interests.45
As previously stated, I find that several recent developments show
some recognition of the harms resulting from university corporatization,
which can lead to hope for change and reform. There are three issues
that have recently been in the spotlight that show that even bad news can
41. See BERNARD BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 84-100 (1953) (regarding the
values of “communalism,” openness in research, and “disinterestness” in science research); ROBERT
K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973); Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 181–84; Rai, supra
note 17, at 88–94.
42. See Marketing of Higher Education, supra note 1, at 772; Social Implications, supra note
1.
43. See KENNEY, supra note 15, at 108–11,121-31; Blumenthal, supra note 30, at 372–73;
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1363, 1375 (1988); Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and
Organisms Undermine the Exchange of Scientific Ideas, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at
B6. See also Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study
of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 133, 149 (2004) (discussing
the negative impact on researchers of the decreased sharing of basic data).
44. Krimsky, supra note 15, at 34; Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug
Studies Published in Symposium Proceedings, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Mar. 1, 1996, at 485; Mark
Clayton, Corporate Cash & Campus Labs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 19, 2001, at 11; Press &
Washburn, supra note 16, at 42.
45. Distance Learning, supra note 1, at 75-83; Press & Washburn, supra note 16, at 42; Peter
Ritter, Bitter Pills, CITY PAGES, July 4, 2001, at http://www.citypages.com/databank/
22/1074/article9665.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
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be good news if it draws attention to problems of conflicts of interest
that can harm the public interest. The first issue concerns the 2004
external evaluation report of the Berkley-Novartis Strategic Corporate
Alliance, concluding that universities should avoid such agreements due
to the problems of conflicts of interest.46 One of the most interesting
aspects of the report is the lengthy discussion of policy issues,
encouraging faculty and the university to engage in public debate about
the identity of the university, including issues of the public mission of
the university, conflicts of interest, and collegial relationships and values
that may be altered by such large corporate funding agreements.47
The second development is the public discussion of the potential
influence of corporate financial support for drug trials at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Since 1992, “user fees” from industry have
supported drug approval reviews conducted by the FDA.48 The recent
spotlight on this issue provides important evidence of the potential
impact on public health when an institutional public interest mission
conflicts with private corporate economic interests. In particular, the
delays and even possible suppression of FDA employees’ reports of the
medical risks of pharmaceutical products such as Vioxx and antidepressant medications for treatment of adolescents have raised
important questions of whether FDA dependence on corporate support
has led to the restriction of the public domain and a lack of integrity in
FDA drug approval decisions.49 Dr. David Graham, the FDA researcher
who had the courage to speak publicly about the FDA’s suppression of
evidence concerning drug safety, has sought whistleblower protection
due to his fear of retaliation from his government employer.50 Any
reasonable person witnessing the problems at the FDA would find a
need for legislative or agency regulations to ensure that the conflict
between public and private interests does not result in the sacrifice of
46. See Lawrence Busch et al., External Review of the Collaborative Research Agreement
between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc. and The Regents of the University of
California (2004), available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/07/external_
novartis_review.pdf.
47. Id. See also Goldie Blumenstyk, Reviewers Give Thumbs Down to Corporate Deal at
Berkeley, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2004, at 25; Rex Dalton, Biotech Funding Deal Judged
to be ‘a Mistake’ for Berkeley, NATURE, Aug. 5, 2004, at 598.
48. See Gardiner Harris, At FDA, Strong Drug Ties and Less Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2004, at A1.
49. See Gardiner Harris, Drug-Safety Reviewer Says F.D.A. Delayed Vioxx Study, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A21; Gardiner Harris, FDA Leader Says Study Tied to Vioxx Wasn’t
Suppressed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at C7.
50. See Denise Grady, FDA Employee Seeks Help from Whistle-Blowers’ Group, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2004, at A21.
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public health and safety.51 In fact, Congress is now considering the need
for an independent arm of the FDA to act as watchdog—this, of course,
means that the original watchdog function of the FDA has been
compromised by its overriding concerns with private corporate
interests.52 Similarly, the ever-increasing role of private industry in the
university—particularly, through licensing of publicly and privately
funded patents—should raise the same concerns about the compromise
of university independence, institutional integrity, reliability of research
results, and the restriction of the public domain.
The third development concerns public access to scholarly
publications reporting results of federally funded research. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) has proposed a plan to place on its website
scholarly articles reporting the results of publicly NIH-funded research.53
This plan would, therefore, expand the public domain by providing the
public with free access to articles that are published in expensive
scientific and medical journals. The NIH plan is opposed by the private,
for-profit journals that are concerned with their economic interests and
by nonprofit journals concerned with maintaining a revenue flow
sufficient to support their publication expenses.54 This debate brings
into the open the question about how to best serve the public, raising
fundamental issues about the role and functions of a public agency like
the NIH in contrast with the private goals of the publishing industry.
These three recent developments demonstrate that even in times of
seemingly insuperable power of capitalist institutions, concerns with the
51. See Denise Grady, A Medical Journal Calls for a New Watchdog on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2004, at A18.
52. See Barry Meier, A Top Republican to Offer Drug Data Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004,
at C3; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Idea of Drug Safety Office Is Already Hitting Snags, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2004, at A30.
53. See Julianne Basinger, NIH Would Post Free Online Papers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Sept. 17, 2004, at 14; Lila Guterman, NIH Proceeds With Plan to Provide Open Access to Scientific
Papers, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 10, 2004, at 19. See also Art Brodsky, Public Knowledge
Disappointed in New Open Access Policy, at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pressroom/releases/
pressrelease.2005-02-03.9256951814 (stating that on February 3, 2005, the NIH announced its
policy that requests NIH-funded authors to make their articles available for free online access on its
PubMed Central Web site within twelve months of official publication date). This policy has been
criticized for weakening the original proposal that would have required NIH-funded authors to make
their papers available for free online access within six months of official publication date. Id. See
also Social Implications, supra note 1; Lila Guterman, The NIH Reportedly Is Weakening Its Plan
for Free Access to Journal Articles, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 28, 2005, at 16 (stating that
additional developments at the NIH to address problems of corporate influence and conflicts of
interest include the NIH issuing a temporary one-year prohibition, announced in September 2004, of
NIH researchers’ paid consulting for corporations, pending further systematic reforms).
54. See Lila Guterman, The Promise and Peril of ‘Open Access,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan.
30, 2004, at 10.
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public interest can still take center stage and demand our attention. I am
encouraged by the existence of organizations that seek to further public
interest goals of universities. Some have been in existence for almost a
century, like the AAUP. Others are newer, such as Universities Allied
for Essential Medicines55 and Public Knowledge,56 which seek to expand
the public domain of academic research. Through a combination of
individual and collective efforts, faculty academic freedom and
university independence can be reclaimed and restored. I hope that
university faculty will seize such developments as opportunities to face
similar issues in the context of the university’s public interest mission
and academic freedom.

55. See UNIVERSITIES ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, ABOUT UNIVERSITIES ALLIED FOR
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, at http://www.essentialmedicines.org/about.html (stating that “Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines” links universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada, to support faculty and student efforts to place pressure on the universities to waive their
patent rights on AIDS medicines in developing countries).
56. See PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, OPEN ACCESS, at http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/
openaccess.html (stating that Public Knowledge describes its goals in its Open Access Project as
“work[ing] for open access to (1) taxpayer-funded research and (2) research that scientists and
scholars consent to publish without payment”).
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